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Παρασκευή, 22 Σεπτέμβριος 2017 12:34

The Fallacies of the Cyprus “Problem”

In the early morning of July 7, 2017, another round of negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations on the so called Cyprus "problem" has ended in Switzerland. Some are trying to understand why. Others, however, have ostensibly entered the "blame game" and/or misinformation, unjustly pointing the finger to the government of the Republic of Cyprus, because, allegedly, it did not make the necessary concessions, so as to satisfy Turkish demands. For those who are trying to understand why, I am arguing, hereinafter, that none should have expected these negotiations (or any previous) to succeed. They were doomed to fail for three reasons, which constitute the fallacies of the so-called Cyprus "problem".

Fallacy One

The first fallacy is that international actors, international organizations, diplomats, and analysts are trying to understand first and deal then with a "problem", and not with a case of pure and brutal military invasion perpetrated by Turkey in 1974 and still preserved illegally until today.[1] This is where all starts and all ends: in the thought dominating (our) minds that we are to deal with a "problem" and not with a flagrant violation of almost all fundamental principals of the United Nations Charter and a series of non implemented compulsory decisions of the Security Council.

In fact, Turkey still maintains some 40.000 heavily armed troops on the island, presenting since 1974 an every day threat for the very existence of what is left territorially of the Republic of Cyprus, making us wonder how the Republic of Cyprus' citizens – EU citizens since 2004 – and its economy may endure such a situation. Turkey, as demonstrated in the negotiations, has not the intention to withdraw its occupation forces from the island (BBC 2017). Most important, even if those troops were to be reduced, Turkey was adamantly against abandoning the status of the guarantor power, contrary to the intention of the other two guarantors (the U.K. and Greece).

Why? The official narrative says in order to guarantee the rights and the security of the Turkish Cypriots (TRTWORLD 2017). Obviously, this is neither the real nor a convincing reason, as Turkey, given its record of human rights, cannot guarantee the rule of law, especially in an EU country. The real motive is the expansionist policy of Turkey, and its tactic to exercise through Cyprus pressure on the Republic, on Greece, on the EU, and more broadly, on the West.

Fallacy Two

It is clear that Turkey does not want to contribute to "solving" the problem. And this is the second fallacy committed by those who consider Turkey well-intentioned to solve the Cyprus "problem" under the rule of the AKP Party and of Erdogan, and given Turkey's current and favorable general and regional distribution of power. Read more...

Δημοσιευμένο στην κατηγορία Άρθρα Γνώμης
Κυριακή, 05 Φεβρουάριος 2017 20:02

This is why Macedonia’s name matters! Thank you Mr. Tajani!

The “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (hereinafter FYROM) and Greece are in dispute over the former’s name, since the time of its independence (1992). FYROM insists on using its communist era name (“Macedonia”), while Greece reacts. It is obvious that Greece did not oppose the formation and does not oppose to the existence of a state in its northern border, especially when the social and commercial relations between Greeks and FYROM’s citizens (either Slavs or Albanians) are very good. Thus here, it is not a case similar to the stance – just to mention one case – of Turkey opposing the formation of any Kurdish state outside its borders. 

On the contrary, Greece has supported the unity of FYROM in 2001 – when the country came close to a civil war – and has provided military assistance to the country’s government. What Greece simply wants through negotiations is that the name of its neighbor does not create confusion and allows the clear distinction between, on the one hand, FYROM’s history and culture, and, on the other, his own. 

It is so simple: a larger population than the one of FYROM, live in Macedonia (you see, here I have to clarify:) of Greece, study at the University of Macedonia, produce goods linked to the region (i.e., Macedonian wine), and undoubtedly speak the same language as Alexander the Great and Aristotle. For years the counterargument I have consistently heard is that everybody knows that ancient Macedonia, Alexander the Great and Aristotle are Greek. Who may be confused? 

Reality however works in mysterious ways and an EU personality, first a Commissioner and now the EU Parliament’s President, fell into the trap of the name and distorted the very basics of History. Mr Tajani, visited in February 2016 Skopje and said the following: “Macedonia is a beautiful country. Everyone in Italy knows Macedonia. Why? Because Alexander the Great and Philip of Macedon are very popular ancestors of yours. Without Alexander [the Great] we would have no Europe because he was the first king who stopped the invasion by Iran and those countries. That’s why they call him Alexander the Great. He strengthened the European borders”. 

Of course Mr Tajani, after the reactions of Greek MEPs, corrected his statement. But the point is not there! The point is that Mr Tajani got confused – as perhaps many others – with a country named “Macedonia”. From there it was rather easy for him, as for many, to slip and fall into the trap.

This event demonstrates that names do matter, and Mr Tajani has to be thanked. They matter in every day life, they matter in business (who can label his product after the name of another trademark?), and they do matter in politics, particularly international. Consequently, it demonstrates why, as Greece argues, a solution should be found in a name that clearly distinguishes among the two what is most important: their culture!



Δημοσιευμένο στην κατηγορία Κουσκουβέλης - Εξωτερική Πολιτική
Δημοσιευμένο στην κατηγορία Κουσκουβέλης - Εξωτερική Πολιτική
Κυριακή, 23 Νοέμβριος 2014 11:05

Τhe Balkans are somehow lost in the transition

Στις 5 Νοεμβρίου ήμουν ανάμεσα στους προσκεκλημένους Έλληνες ακαδημαϊκούς στη συνάντηση των μελών της Κοινοβουλευτικής Συνέλευσης του ΝΑΤΟ. Παρακάτω μπορείτε να διαβάσετε την ομιλία μου προς τα μέλη της Συνέλευσης.

Κουσκουβέλης Βουλή ΝΑΤΟ


Ladies and gentlemen,
My topic is "A Greek perspective on security challenges in the Balkans". Obviously is the perspective of a Greek scholar, and not of the government or any other institution of this country.

My main thesis is that, twenty five years after the end of the Cold War, the Balkans are somehow lost in the transition and face several security challenges.

I will start with a brief account of what has happened in the last twenty five years, and, then, I will list ten possible security threats for the region.

The reality of the post-Cold War era was hard and caused changes in the region - some of which were extremely painful. The collapse of communism in neighbouring countries and the opening of borders led to the first wave of about 600.000 economic immigrants in Greece, with obvious economic, political and social consequences.

Since 1991, a decade of wars has started in the former Yugoslavia: in Croatia (1992-1993), in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1993-1996), in Kosovo (1999-2000). To these wars, one should add two major crises, almost civil wars, the first in Albania (1997), and, the second, in FYROM, to which Greece assumed a particularly stabilizing role.

However, Greece and especially my region, the region of Macedonia, were negatively affected by these events. Former Yugoslavia was the land access to the rest of Europe that was lost for about a decade, leading to the rise of transport costs for Greek products, and to the consequent loss of markets.
A result of these changes was the appearance of new states, one of which, the FYROM, in the northern borders of Greece, claiming not just a name, but also land, and a great part of Hellenic history and culture. This dispute remains unsolved, due basically to irredentist claims against Greece, and to the lack of willingness to compromise from the government of Skopje.

During the same period, Bulgaria and Romania went through their own hardships, and their economic and political restructuring.. Ultimately, the two countries joined all Western institutions and, in 2007, they have joined the EU.
Greece has thus acquired for the first time land borders with the EU, and this offers a sense of security for the international transports sector. A feeling of security has been also created for the Greek investments in the two countries, which, as you may know, are important. Over time and progressively, new investment opportunities are created in areas such as education, culture, tourism, new technologies.

Without forgetting the beneficial for the region accession to the EU of Slovenia and most recently of Croatia, Bulgaria's and Romania's EU membership contributed to a more effective cooperation in areas of "low" politics, such as the fight against crime, immigration, environment, energy, transports, etc.
Of particular importance is the increase in the free movement and cross border installation of citizens. Something similar to the free movement of citizens is happening in the world of businesses. The development of regions across the border has already begun, because of the free movement, leading to further cross border cooperation.

Furthermore, Greece and the region are now benefiting of an East-West highway connection (via Egnatia, from the Ionian Sea to Turkey) and the whole region of Macedonia will benefit from the construction of the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), transferring natural gas from Azerbaijan all the way through Turkey, Greece, and Albania, to Italy. The improvement of the railway linking Thessaloniki with Skopje, Sofia and Constantinople will benefit great the countries linked.

Yet, there are several threats to the security of the region, resulting from the past and present causes. I prepared and present you a list of ten:

1. Interstate disputes resulting out of revisionism and ultra-nationalism.

2. Inter-ethnic tensions

3. Corruption

4. Organized crime

5. Religious radicalism

6. Demographic pressures and imbalances

7. Related to demographic imbalances are the emigration and immigration pressures

8. Environmental issues

9. Poor economic performance
Based on 2013 data, the following may be noted:
• Although their real GDP growth rates (on average) were higher during the last decade than the respective in the EU(28), they continue to be the poorest in terms of GDP per capita (with the exception of Greece), which remains less than half of EU(28).
• They are characterized by relatively higher inlfation rates (exception: disinflation in Greece and in Bosnia & Herzegovina).
• Unemployment rates are double on average than the respective in EU(28) countries.
• Nominal monthly wages in FYROM, Bulgaria, and Romania are less than 200 Euros/month, when the average in the Balkan region is around 300, and in Greece around 700 Euros/month.

10. International Environment
The precarious stability of the region was, and is still threatened by conflicts in Europe's near abroad. The events of the so-called "Arab spring" in Northern Africa, the war in Libya, and the war in Syria and Iraq have produced, besides the huge toll of human and material destruction, an important flow of refugees towards Europe through Greece and Italy, often with tragic consequences. Moreover, to these events one should add the Ukrainian crisis, which provoked negative consequences in many sectors, particularly the economic, for all countries in the region.

Finally, and this will conclude my presentation, the stability and well being of the region depends from the behaviour and the involvement of outside the region states (from the Northeast, the East, and the Southeast).
In my opinion, any government inside and especially outside the region, before acting, should bear in mind that all Balkan states have opted for a European orientation, and the consequent stability and prosperity. Self restraint from all actors inside and outside the Balkans, inviolability of borders, deepening of democratic institutions, and economic development will benefit all peoples of the region.




Δημοσιευμένο στην κατηγορία Κουσκουβέλης - Εξωτερική Πολιτική
Παρασκευή, 01 Νοέμβριος 2013 09:34

Greece should not waste opportunities

For three years now, Greece deals with the issues of its economic crisis. Parallel to them, the foreign policy issues continue to increase and need to be addressed. It seems, however, that there is no strategy for them. Even worse, the foreign policy issues seem to have being sacrificed to the crisis' alter, when Greece could just act in a smart way, by, for example, delimiting its Mediterranean Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), and turn it and its resources into one of the tools that would help the country address its economic problems.

Certainly there have been meetings of Greek officials with their counterparts from FYROM, Turkey, Cyprus, Israel, and, most recently, Egypt. Yet, important questions remain unanswered. What is Greece's policy towards Turkey? Is it a policy of settlement of disputes from a position of equal strength, is it a policy of bandwagoning, or a policy of appeasement? What is the country's goal in the new round of negotiations with FYROM, regarding the name issue? Will Greece support actively the Cypriot efforts in order to end the Turkish illegal occupation? What will Greece do about the declaration and delimitation of a Mediterranean EEZ and when?

Reasonably, one could argue that when you are in debt you can not easily perform foreign policy. This is wrong in the context of Greek bilateral relations. First, to put it simply, Greece does not owe money to Ankara, Skopje or any of its neighbors. Secondly, it still maintains some other comparative advantages in relation to them, especially its participation to both the EU and NATO. Thirdly, even in lean years, foreign policy is a matter of priorities, strategy and determination; the attitude of each country towards international issues is a matter of political ability and choices.

Cyprus is showing Greece and everyone how a small country, under the threat of the invader, assessed correctly the emerging energy context in its region and moved decisively. Late President Papadopoulos allied with U.S. and Israeli economic interests in order to search for hydrocarbons in the Mediterranean. Former President Christofias, with a communist ideological background, brought Cyprus into an alliance with Israel. Their moves have begun to bear fruit, judging by the perspective of natural gas exploitation, and by the statements of powerful governments on the exploitation of the Eastern Mediterranean energy resources and the Turkish illegal occupation.

Contrary to Cyprus, it seems that Greece, although it may only gain from the emerging situation, has not done much towards benefiting from the new energy opportunities. Greece, however, may only gain by closely cooperating with Israel and Cyprus – the only democratic states in the Eastern Mediterranean. The three states may provide valuable energy resources to their partners, and offer, in comparison to other routes (i.e., via Turkey), an alternative and safe route for the streaming of energy towards the West.

Thus, Greece must define as soon as possible its foreign policy objectives, gain international support, and act accordingly. No opportunities should be wasted, especially when, in the medium-term, they can contribute to the country's exit from the economic crisis.

Δημοσιευμένο στην κατηγορία Κουσκουβέλης - Εξωτερική Πολιτική
Κυριακή, 31 Μάρτιος 2013 16:44

Israel's apology to Turkey was a mistake

A must read article from my colleague Efraim Inbahr, with whom we've had a very interesting discussion at the University of Macedonia a couple of weeks ago. 

Israel's apology to Turkey for "operational errors" in the Mavi Marmara incident is a diplomatic mistake both in terms of substance and timing. It's hard to understand or justify Israel's weekend apology to Turkey. While the use of Israeli force in the Mavi Marmara "flotilla" incident was not very elegant, it was perfectly legitimate – as the UN-appointed "Palmer Commission" unequivocally determined. Moreover, the incident was a Turkish provocation that warrants a Turkish apology, not an Israeli one.

Worse still, the hopes in Jerusalem for a new era in Israeli-Turkish relations in exchange for the apology are simply illusory.

The Israeli apology will hardly stop Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's regular Israel-bashing rhetoric. Nor has it secured a clear Turkish commitment for the resumption of full diplomatic relations.

Moreover, Erdogan already has conveyed his intention to visit Hamas-ruled Gaza. Such a visit is a slap in the face to both Jerusalem and Washington.

Turkey, under the AKP, an Islamist party, has gradually adopted a new foreign policy, fueled by neo-Ottoman and Islamist impulses, whose goal is to gain a leadership role in the Middle East and the Islamic world.

Attaining this objective requires harsh criticism of Israel, which has generated great popularity for Erdogan and Turkey. Unfortunately, vicious attacks on Israel come easily for Erdogan, who is plainly and simply an anti-Semite.

Israel has failed to fully grasp Turkey's new Islamist direction. For several years already, we no longer have a pro-Western Turkey with which Israel can cooperate in the turbulent Middle East. Ankara and Jerusalem have very different views on a variety of issues. While Turkey is truly an important and powerful player in regional politics, its behavior over the past decade actually harms Israeli interests. It does not follow the US policy on Iran and helps circumvent the international sanctions imposed on Tehran. As a matter of fact, Turkey helps Iran, a country with genocidal intentions toward Israel, to progress in its nuclear program.

Turkey also sides with Hamas, an Islamist terrorist organization dedicated to the destruction of the Jewish state, and helps it entrench its rule in Gaza and gain international support and recognition.

Turkey is also actively helping radical Islamic Sunni elements take over Syria. It also supports the idea of violent opposition against Israel's presence in the Golan Heights. As such, the hope that Israel and Turkey can cooperate together with the US in limiting the damage from a disintegrating Syria has little validity.

Furthermore, Turkey, still a NATO member, is obstructing the efforts of Israel in developing its ties with this organization. The Turkish position in NATO also hinders the Western alliance's ability to deal more effectively with the Iranian nuclear challenge.

Turkey's policy in the Mediterranean similarly clashes with Israeli vital interests. Its bullying of Cyprus interferes with Israel's plans to export via this island its newly found gas riches to an energy- thirsty Europe. Turkey, that sees itself as an energy bridge to Europe, does not want the Israeli competition. It may even use military force to maintain its role in the energy market.

What is also important is how the Israeli apology will be perceived in a region whose prism on international relations is power politics. Inevitably, Israel under Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu will be seen as weak, bowing to American pressure. Public regrets about use of force erode deterrence and project weakness.

Perceived weakness usually invites aggression in our tough neighborhood.

This is also what Ankara thinks, which is very problematic for Israel. Moreover, Tehran and Cairo, both ruled by radical Islamists, cherish the Turkish victory over the Zionist entity.

The Israeli-initiated apology is an American diplomatic success, but reflects a dangerous American misperception of Turkey as representing "moderate Islam," which is incredible naïve. Turkey is distancing itself from the West and its values.

Nowadays, more journalists are in jail in Turkey than in China.

Israel's friends in Turkey, part of the democratic opposition, must be bewildered as Israel hands Erdogan a diplomatic achievement, buttressing the grip of the Islamist AKP on Turkish politics.

The timing is particularly troubling.

Turkish foreign policy is in crisis because its much-heralded approach to the Middle East ("zero problems with its neighbors") is in shambles. Turkey needed a diplomatic success here more than Israel did. Israel could have negotiated a better formula to end the impasse in bilateral relations.

Only very recently, we heard Erdogan call Zionism a crime against humanity. He did not apologize, as he should have, but told a Danish newspaper that he was misunderstood.

This was part of a concerted effort on part of Turkey to prevent additional international criticism on this issue. Nevertheless, the pressure was on Ankara, not Jerusalem.

Furthermore, an apology to a Hamas supporter, just a day after Hamas again launched rockets against Israel, communicates terrible weakness. Sanctioning an Erdogan victory trip to Gaza at this particular moment is terribly foolish, too, particularly when Israel is seeking to bolster the standing of the rival Palestinian Authority.

It is highly unlikely that we will see a reversal or a turnaround in Turkey's anti-Western and anti- Israeli policies. The apology from Jerusalem only enhances Turkish ambitions and weakens Israel's deterrence.

source: Middle East Forum


Δημοσιευμένο στην κατηγορία Ενδιαφέροντα
Δευτέρα, 11 Μάρτιος 2013 11:18

The Problem with Turkey’s “Zero Problems”

My most recent research work: The Problem with Turkey’s “Zero Problems”, is now published in the current issue of the Middle East Quarterly. 

The article discusses the status of Turkey's international relations under the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) from the perspective that the AKP's decisions show the political party's insincerity in carrying out its "zero-problems with neighbors" foreign policy. The AKP's policy is stated to be one in which the government eliminates or minimizes as much as possible its relations with neighboring countries. Turkey's current and historical relations with Greece, Cyprus, Azerbaijan, Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Israel are discussed.

You can find the full article here.



Η πιο πρόσφατη ακαδημαϊκή δημοσίευση μου, ένα άρθρο με τίτλο Το πρόβλημα με τα μηδενικά προβλήματα της Τουρκίας κυκλοφόρησε στο τρέχον τεύχος του Middle East Quarterly.

Το άρθρο πραγματεύεται τις διεθνείς σχέσεις της Τουρκίας υπό το κόμμα της Δικαιοσύνης και της Αναπτυξης (AKP), υποστηρίζοντας ότι οι αποφάσεις του AKP αποδεικνύουν την ανειλικρίνεια του πολιτικού αυτού κόμματος στο να ακολουθήσει μια πραγματική εξωτερική πολιτική μηδενικών προβλημάτων με τους γείτονες. Η πολιτική του AKP έχει καθοριστεί ως πολιτική που περιορίζει ή μειώνει κατά το δυνατό τις σχέσεις με τις γειτονικές χώρες. Εξετάζονται οι τρέχουσες αλλά και οι ιστορικές σχέσεις της Τουρκίας με την Ελλάδα, την Κύπρο, το Αζερμπαϊτζάν, τη Συρία, το Ιράκ, το Ιράν και το Ισραήλ.

Tο άρθρο είναι διαθέσιμο εδώ.


Δημοσιευμένο στην κατηγορία Κουσκουβέλης - Εξωτερική Πολιτική
Παρασκευή, 24 Αύγουστος 2012 08:34

"The High Cost of Austerity"

Δείτε ένα σύντομο αλλά πολύ ενδιαφέρον video στο οποίο ο Peter Gourevitch υποστηρίζει ότι την περίοδο της κρίσης η δημοσιονομική αυστηρότητα σκοτώνει την ανάπτυξη που έχει ανάγκη η οικονομία. 

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"The High Cost of Austerity" with Peter Gourevitch, political scientist and founding dean of the School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at UC San Diego. Gourevitch argues that government spending should increase in troubled economic times to boost employment, raise tax revenue and eventually reduce the national debt.

Δημοσιευμένο στην κατηγορία Ενδιαφέροντα
Τετάρτη, 22 Ιούνιος 2011 14:17

H πιο μεγάλη ευθύνη

Το παρόν είναι μία προσπάθεια να καταγράψω κάποιες από τις σκέψεις ή τα έντονα συναισθήματα που κυριαρχούν μέσα μου τον τελευταίο καιρό, σχετικά με την οικονομική κρίση που βιώνει η πατρίδα μας.

Η πρώτη σκέψη, που πάντα έρχεται στο μυαλό μου, είναι η προσωπική μου ευθύνη για ό,τι το αρνητικό ή ταπεινωτικό έχει συμβεί στον τόπο μας. Τι έκανα λάθος ως πολίτης; Τι θα μπορούσα να είχα κάνει διαφορετικά; Σε τι κόσμο συνέβαλα να ζήσει το παιδί μου, οι φοιτητές μου, τα παιδιά των άλλων; Απαντήσεις έχω, όμως θα μου επιτρέψετε να τις κρατήσω για τις πολλές ώρες αυτοκριτικής και σχεδιασμού ενός μέλλοντος σε διαφορετικές βάσεις.

Η δεύτερη σκέψη που αυτομάτως ξεπηδά είναι η ανησυχία για εκείνους που έχασαν ή που θα χάσουν τη δουλειά τους. Δεν είναι αφηρημένο αυτό που λέω. Δεν το γράφω για να είμαι πολιτικά ορθός. Το γράφω γιατί αυτοί που έχασαν τη δουλειά τους και τώρα ψάχνουν απελπισμένα έχουν και όνομα και πρόσωπο. Τους γνωρίζω καλά, τους γνωρίζουμε όλοι καλά! Πλέον, βρίσκονται είτε στο οικογενειακό μας περιβάλλον είτε στον κοινωνικό μας περίγυρο.

Αναρωτιέμαι επίσης συχνά αν είμαι αγανακτισμένος. Όχι δεν εντάσσομαι σε αυτήν την κατηγορία. Δεν ανήκω στους αγανακτισμένους γιατί πιστεύω ότι η αγανάκτηση δεν αρκεί και δεν χρησιμεύει. Μπορεί να ήμουν θυμωμένος, αλλά πιιστεύω ότι το σωστό είναι να διοχετεύουμε την ενέργεια του θυμού στη θετική κατεύθυνση. Γι’αυτό θεωρώ ότι εντάσσομαι στους προβληματισμένους. Σ’αυτούς που προσπαθούμε να δούμε τι θα κάνουμε από εδώ και πέρα.

Άραγε, τί θα κάνουμε από εδώ και πέρα; Η απάντηση είναι απλή και δοκιμασμένη. Θα δουλέψουμε και πάλι σκληρά – όσο πιο σκληρά γίνεται – με συνέπεια και ευθύνη, ο καθένας στο αντικείμενό του. Κυρίως, όμως, σ’αυτήν τη δύσκολη περίοδο, θα διατηρήσουμε την ανθρωπιά μας, την ψυχραιμία μας και τη σύνεσή μας.

Αναπόφευκτα, τέλος, πάντα έρχεται το ερώτημα «πώς φθάσαμε ως εδώ»; Και αναπόφευκτα, λόγω επιστημονικού μου αντικειμένου, στρέφομαι στα μεγάλα ζητήματα εξωτερικής πολιτικής της χώρας. Σπεύδω εκ προοιμίου να δηλώσω την επιστημονική μου άποψη, ότι αντιτίθεμαι και απεχθάνομαι τις θεωρίες συνομωσίας. Όμως, καθώς το άναρχο και ανταγωνιστικό διεθνές σύστημα είναι η πραγματικότητα, καθώς τα κράτη επιδιώκουν έστω και σχετικά οφέλη, μοιραία καταλήγω σε μία σειρά ερωτήματα, για τα οποία δεν έχω απαντήσεις. Ποιοί έχασαν από την ένταξη της Ελλάδας στο ευρώ; Ποίων τα σχέδια κατέστρεψε το μεγάλο «όχι» στο Σχέδιο Ανάν; Πόσο σημαντικό ήταν το «όχι» στο Βουκουρέστι που άφησε εκτός Συμμαχίας – ξεχάστε τα Σκόπια – την Ουκρανία και τη Γεωργία; Ποια συμφέροντα κερδίζουν από την ακύρωση του αγωγού Μπουργκάς-Αλεξανδρούπολη και ποια θα κερδίσουν από τη χρεωκοπία της Ελλάδας;

Επαναλαμβάνω: δεν έχω απαντήσεις σε όλα αυτά τα ερωτήματα. Και κυρίως δεν λέω ότι ευθύνονται κάποιοι άλλοι. Η μεγάλη ευθύνη είναι δική μας που δεν πήραμε τα μέτρα μας. Και η πιο μεγάλη ευθύνη είναι τώρα, που πρέπει να παραμείνουμε ενωμένοι, ψύχραιμοι, νηφάλιοι, με πίστη στην Κοινοβουλευτική Δημοκρατία και στις ικανότητές μας. Κυρίως δε, να δυσπιστούμε σε οτιδήποτε εύκολο, λαϊκίστικο, απολίτικο ή διχαστικό. Γιατί πολλοί από εμάς θα δυστυχήσουν και πολλοί άλλοι θα χαρούν και θα πλουτίσουν από τη δική μας αποτυχία.

Ευχαριστώ τον Βαγγέλη Πλάκα που φιλοξένησε την άποψη μου στην ιστοσελίδα του Πολιτικά Νέα

Δημοσιευμένο στην κατηγορία Κουσκουβέλης - Ελλάδα

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Καθώς συνεχίζουμε να επεξεργαζόμαστε τα videos από τη συνέντευξη τύπου του Kenneth Waltz με σκοπό να δώσουμε την ευκαιρία σε όσο περισσότερους μπορούμε να τα παρακολουθήσουν και να ακούσουν τις απόψεις του αμερικανού καθηγητή, αναρτώ σήμερα ακόμη δύο videos. Στο πρώτο πολύ ενδιαφέρον video ο καθηγητής, μετά τα εισαγωγικά του σχόλια για την επίσκεψη του στην Ελλάδα και την αναγόρευσή του σε επίτιμο διδάκτορα του Τμήματος Διεθνών και Ευρωπαϊκών Σπουδών του Πανεπιστημίου Μακεδονίας, αναφέρεται στη θέση των ΗΠΑ στο διεθνές σύστημα λέγοντας χαρακτηριστικά ότι η δύναμη των ΗΠΑ βρίσκεται σε πτώση.

Στο δεύτερο video ο καθηγητής Waltz απαντά σε ερώτηση σχετική με την Ελλάδα και την οικονομική κρίση.

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Δημοσιευμένο στην κατηγορία Κουσκουβέλης - Εξωτερική Πολιτική
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